



Thepossibility ofwarti increases in direct
proportioni to theeffectiveness ofthe
instr-uments oJwar.
Norman Cousins
Peter's Quotations:Ideasfor Our lime, 1977
W;r hen someone cultivates patho-
genic bacteria, fungi, viruses, or
certain chemical compounds
specifically to kill people or transmit dis-
ease, that's biological warfare. A lesser-
known form of biological warfare targets
major food crops instead of people, and
carries the potential to wreak environmen-
tal health havoc. After health care, agricul-
ture has been the largest market to benefit
from genomic research and biotechnology.
But while the ability to diagnose plant dis-
eases and develop targeted treatments has
improved agricultural products and yields,
the same technologies can be used to build
better biological warfare bugs, turning bac-
teria, viruses, and toxins into potential
weapons ofmass destruction.
In poor countries where millions
depend on staple crops such as rice, an act of
anticrop bioterrorism that destroys the har-
vest would create famine. According to
authors Paul Rogers, Simon Whitby, and
Malcolm Dando in their article "Biological
Warfare against Crops," published in the
June 1999 issue of Scientific American, such
an attack "would be at least as costly in
human terms as an anthrax attack on a city."
The resulting malnutrition and starvation
would take the greatest toll among the poor-
est populations, and would generally reduce
immune resistance to a range of common
illnesses. Even in more developed North
American or western European countries,
anticrop bioterrorism would take a toll, the
authors say; the tendency ofsuch nations to
grow one or two major food crops would
give disease-agent organisms a much bigger
bang for their pathogenic buck. And an
enemy could release organisms when weath-
er or a crop's own growth stage guarantees
at least a regional epidemic. Even a reason-
ably developed country that managed to halt
an outbreak short of total devastation could
suffer massive economic losses.
Despite the futuristic sound of the
word, bioterrorism is nothing new. People
and pathogens have evolved together over
centuries against a backdrop of agriculture.
Soldiers have used disease as a weapon at
least since the days of the Roman Empire,
when enemies routinely threw dead animals
into each other's water supplies to poison
them. Another thing hasn't changed: people
are as vulnerable to new and reemerging
pathogens as they've always been. But the
release-malicious or otherwise-of haz-
ardous infectious agents is still only a theo-
retical threat to national and global security
because, at least as far as anyone knows,
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such bioterrorism hasn't happened yet.
Some think it won't ever happen, but others
believe it easily could, and that's gotten the
attention ofthose who would be in the front
lines-mainly crop growers, plant scientists,
and soldiers.
TheWeapons No OneWants to Use
In his 1993 book How to Make War, James
F. Dunnigan writes that, in terms ofinflict-
ing newplant diseases on enemy cropland or
decimating herds of domestic animals with
species-specific microbes, "no one seems too
eager to unleash biological warfare. There
appear to be too many risks with this poten-
tially uncontrollable form ofcombat."
In fact, while anticrop bioterrorism
isn't much more than a theory, its potential
is real enough. For example, according to
Rogers, Whitby, and Dando, Iraq had an
active bioweapons program before the Gulf
War, part of which dealt with wheat smut.
The likely target of this anticrop effort was
Iran, where wheat is the most important
cereal crop. However, these operations were
effectively shut down by the United Nations
during the war.
With everything from natural plant dis-
ease outbreaks and crop management prob-
lems to extreme weather and pest infestations
to worry about, how seriously do growers
and plant scientists take the potential threat
of anticrop bioterrorism? No one's laughing
down at the American Farm Bureau
Federation, which calls itself the "voice of
agriculture." Stewart Truelsen, director of
broadcast services for the federation,
describes a fictitious scene in the online arti-
cle "America's Achilles' Heel: Food Supply"
in which "Slobodan Milosevic pounded his
fist on his desk and looked up at the generals
standing before him. 'Ifonly we could find a
way to retaliate against the U.S. civilian pop-
ulation forwhat their military is doing to us,'
he said. A scientist standing behind the gen-
erals edged his way forward and said, 'Maybe
I can help. I am a plant pathologist."'
Writes Truelsen, "This scene never
took place that we know of, but it's hardly
farfetched.... Think about it for a minute.
A major disruption of our food supply
would be more devastating than an oil
embargo and it would be totally unexpected
and unprecedented. Americans are so used
to finding supermarket shelves stocked with
food they wouldn't know what to do ifour
corn, wheat, and soybean crops were
destroyed. These commodities are used in so
many food products, and to feed livestock,
that there wouldn't be much to eat without
them."
Most people know something about
the danger to people of biological weapons;
fewer realize the potential dire effects of
using pathogens to cause a food-crop epi-
demic or contaminate the food supply.
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According to Norman Schaad, a phytobacte-
riologist in the Foreign Disease-Weed
Science Research Unit within the U.S.
Department ofAgriculture's Agricultural
Research Service, the U.S. agriculture infra-
structure is susceptible to disease outbreaks
resulting from bioterrorism. Says Schaad, "As
members of the plant science community,
we are aware ofthe risk and feel it's impor-
tant to interact with other scientists and
agencies in a cooperative effort to review the
issues." A symposium titled "Plant
Pathology's Role in Anti-Crop Bioterrorism
and Food Security," held in August 1999
during the joint American Phytopathological
Society (APS) and Canadian Phyto-
pathological Society (CPS) annual meeting
in Montreal, Canada, brought together
plant pathologists, military intelligence
officers, and criminal experts to discuss
anticrop bioterrorism with speakers from
federal agencies, universities, and the pri-
vate sector. It was," Schaad says, "the first
international symposium held to raise the
awareness ofexperts in the agricultural sci-
entific community," and the first meeting
to urge plant pathologists to help develop
science-based defense measures against
anticrop bioterrorism.
Experts who spoke at the meeting sug-
gested that being prepared for an anticrop
attack would present a strong deterrent.
Possible strategies for preparing for such an
attack indude developing a global electronic
system to track new and emerging plant
pathogens and rapid diagnostic tests to iden-
tify anticrop attacks in their early stages.
Highlights of the symposium and links to
related materials are featured on the Crop
Biosecurity page oftheAPS Web site located
at http://www.scisoc.org/. Topics featured
on the site include historical perspectives on
bioterrorism, identification and "fingerprint-
ing" of pathogens, risk assessment, ground
surveillance, andprotection ofinfrastructure.
NewandEmerging Diseases
Many factors contribute to what appears to
be an increase in new and emerging plant
pathogens. No one knows the exact causes,
but in nearly all likely scenarios-climate
changes, disrupted ecosystems, new releases
of genetic material, contaminated seeds,
increased international air travel and trade,
pesticide-induced chemical resistance, and
increased use of transgenic crops-people
play a role.
Pathogens can be dassified into five cat-
egories, according to scientists at the
Department of Plant Pathology at North
Carolina State University in Raleigh: new
(pathogens detected in the last five years),
emerging (pathogen incidence has increased
in the last 20 years), reemerging (previously
controlled pathogens associated with chemi-
cal resistance or changes in management or
cultivars), threatening (pathogens not report-
ed or limited in distribution in the United
States), and chronic/spreading (pathogens
known longer than 20 years and causing
increased concern). The APS Web site offers
a list ofplant pathogens believed to be suit-
able for use as weapons. Among these are
viruses (such as banana bunchy top virus and
Fiji disease virus, which attacks sugarcane),
fungi (such as Tilletia indica, which causes
the wheat disease Karnal bunt), and bacteria
(such as Liberobacter spp. and Xanthomonas
campestris, both ofwhich attack citrus fruits).
Most key crops on the planet are sus-
ceptible to 10 diseases that have potential as
weapons, according to a working paper by
the United Nations. Three ofthe most dam-
aging diseases, say the Scientific American
authors, are wheat rust, sugarcane smut, and
rice blast. Other crops at risk include corn,
potatoes, many kinds ofbeans, fruits, coffee,
and pine trees (economically important for
lumber). Periodic cereal rust and smut epi-
demics around the world ruin crops worth
hundreds ofmillions ofdollars.
PreventionthroughMonitoring
Until recently, says David Huxsoll, dean of
the School of Veterinary Medicine at
Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge
and a member of the American Society of
Microbiology's Task Force on Biological
Weapons Defense, "the United States has
been complacent about the threat of bioter-
rorism." In his APS/CPS symposium presen-
tation, "Biological Terrorism: Identifying
and Protecting Our Infrastructure" (available
on the APS site), Huxsoll says that it's "quite
likely that terrorists will use weapons ofmass
destruction against the United States,"
directed at targets that include tourism,
transportation, livestock, and crops. Even
small outbreaks ofexotic disease in livestock
or crops, he says, could reduce production of
essential foods, incapacitate the agricultural
base, and, through export embargoes,
remove U.S. agricultural products from the
world market.
To reduce the possibility of deliberate
introductions of crop pathogens as acts of
terrorism, researchers must be able to finger-
print pathogens at the molecular level and
discriminate between naturally occurring and
deliberately introduced outbreaks. To make
these determinations, they must be able to
track new and emerging diseases, but there is
currently no rapid international reporting
system. To address the problem, several
domestic and international surveillance,
tracking, and reporting efforts are underway.
For example, 0. W. Barnett, head of the
Department of Plant Pathology at North
Carolina State University, is leading an effort
to prepare and update a list of new and
emerging plant pathogens to be posted on
the Internet at http://www.ces.ncsu.edu/
depts/ent/clinic/Emerging/vdis.htm.
Similarly, the European and Mediterranean
Plant Protection Organization, an intergov-
ernmental organization responsible for inter-
national cooperation in plant protection in
Europe and the Mediterranean region, main-
tains a plant pathogen alert list, available on
the organization's Web site at
http://www/eppo.org/index.html, as part of
its strategy against the introduction and
spread ofcrop and forest pests.
In June 1999, the NATO workshop
"BTWC [Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention] Security Implications of
Human, Animal, and Plant Epidemiology"
was held at the Cantacuzino Institute in
Bucharest, Romania. Attendees discussed
the need for epidemiology and disease
reporting and ways to investigate and ana-
lyze outbreaks. A report of this meeting, as
well as related reports on efforts to strength-
en the BTWC worldwide are available at the
Web site of the Department of Peace
Studies of the University of Bradford,
United Kingdom, located at
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/.
On 20 May 1999, Dorothy Preslar,
Washington Project Officer of the
Federation ofAmerican Scientists (FAS), tes-
tified before the House Commerce
Subcommittee on Oversight and Inves-
tigations on the adequacy offederal laws to
address dangerous biological agents, includ-
ing those that may be used by terrorists to
attack the food production resources of the
United States. The FAS, Preslar said, sup-
ports efforts to raise the level ofaccountabili-
ty oflabs in ensuring that deadly pathogens
and toxins are secure from loss or theft and
thus do not escape into the environment.
National security and public health will be
served ifsuch agents remain in secure envi-
ronments at all times and if facilities that
handle them are held strictly responsible for
their safe storage, proper handling, restricted
access, and closely monitored transfer.
Anther measure suggested by the FAS
includes developing and implementing
detection technologies for proactive inter-
vention against bioterrorist attacks.
Two types ofstrategies-preventive and
responsive-can minimize the potential
threat to the planet's food supplies, says Jan
E. Leach, a distinguished professor ofplant
pathology at Kansas State University in
Manhattan, in her APS/CPS symposium
presentation, "Assuring Food Security:
Detecting and Controlling Modified
Pathogens" (available on the APS site). A
preventive strategy, Leach explains, involves
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understanding the structure, function, and
evolution of genes involved in pathogenesis
and virulence, and can highlight possible
sites of genetic manipulation. A responsive
strategy-identifying pathogens early, quick-
ly, and accurately-is key to controlling dis-
ease, she says.
FightingBackwith Research
Laboratory analysis can be cumbersome and
tedious, requiring expensive equipment, spe-
cial labs, and highly trained staff, and taking
days or weeks to produce results. It will also
be the single most critical tool needed in the
event of an intentional release of anticrop
pathogens. Procedures commonly used to
investigate a suspected plant intoxication are
described in a 1996 report by the FAS
Working Group on Biological Weapons
Verification tided Report ofthe Subgroup on
Investigation ofAlleged Use or Release of
Biologicalor Toxin WeaponsAgents. Scientists
and possibly soldiers would have to collect
samples of the suspected pathogen, develop
and screen chemical assays, identify and vali-
date molecules, collect toxicology data, and
integrate chemical, biological, and genomic
data, to name just a few parts of the likely
process. In the event of an anticrop attack,
no onewouldwant to wait days orweeks for
results.
Over the last decade, the pharmaceuti-
cal and biotechnology industries have led the
push to automate, and thereby speed up, as
many lab processes as possible. Laboratory
automation entails a collection ofcomputer-
based and robotic devices and systems that
help researchers work together on complex
projects, speed up testing times, and improve
the quality oflab products and services. In
September 1999, Hewlett-Packard became
the first producer ofa complete commercial
analytical laboratory on a computer chip-
an analytical lab the size of a credit card
that's cheap, fast, and mobile. Any country
that becomes a target of anticrop terrorists
will need all this technology and more to
avoideconomic and medicaldisaster.
Tony Beugelsdijk, a laboratory automa-
tion and robotics expert at Los Alamos
National Laboratory in New Mexico, says,
"Research efforts at Los Alamos and at the
National Institute of Standards and
Technology have made the needed level of
standardization increasingly available from
instrument manufacturers." He continues,
"For the first time it's possible to envision a
library ofchemical and biological assay func-
tionality represented physically in hardware
devices and software routines that perform
tasks like extraction, thermal cycling, incuba-
tion, separation, detection, data reduction,
statistical pattern recognition, and more.
These could be quickly assembled into inte-
grated systems that perform a particular
assay-say, to characterize a potential bio-
threat agent." Beugelsdijk helped organize a
two-day conference on automation in threat
reduction and infectious disease research that
was held in April 1999 at the National
AcademyofSciences inWashington, DC.
However, characterizing the threat is
only part of the solution. With the ever-
increasing understanding ofgenetics and
molecular biology, researchers on both sides
ofthe cornfield can use transgenics to build
betterpathogens. Thissametechnologycould
also make it possible to survive the really big
biology experiment that true anticrop bioter-
rorism could launch. And that's what they're
working toward in the Defense Science
Office of the Defense Advanced Research
Project Agency (DARPA), a division of the
Department of Defense. The focus of
DARPA's Unconventional Pathogen
Countermeasures Program is todevelop revo-
lutionary broad-spectrum countermeasures
versatile enough to eliminate either natural or
modified biological threats. Program strate-
gies include defeating pathogens' ability to
enter the body, identifying novel pathogen
vulnerabilities based on critical molecularsur-
vival mechanisms or pathogenesis, building
unique, robust vehicles to deliver counter-
measures, and modulating the immune
responsetopathogenicmicroorganisms.
Examples of such new technologies
include pathogen genomic sequencing,
which will be used to identify molecular
components of pathogens that researchers
can then use to develop novel detection,
diagnostic, and therapeutic strategies, and
advanced consequence management strate-
gies for bioterrorist attacks indudingfast and
appropriate operational and medical
response. DARPA's Enhanced Consequence
Management Planning and Support System
will coordinate the responses ofcivilian first
responders and federal agencies and allow
them to react 10 times faster. The system
uses commercial hardware and software and
ordinary communications technology to dis-
tribute consequence management plans, mis-
sion data, situational awareness, and patient
tracking to all responding organizations dur-
ing biological incidents, fires, floods, and
otherdisasters.
Skeptics maycontinue toviewefforts to
address potential bioterrorist attacks as much
ado about nothing. "For all the work that
seems to have been done on biological
weapons in [the 20th] century," writes
Dunnigan in How to Make War, "no one
seems to have used them." But many scien-
tists and governments around the world are
preparing for what theyview as an inevitable
event. To them, it's not a question of
whether an anticrop bioterrorist attack will
occur-it'sonlyaquestion ofwhen.
Cher Pelerin
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